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Free Speech Zones: 




Following Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush Administration began impos-
ing every increasing limitations on civil rights. One example is 
the implementation of free speech zones, a practice in which po-
litical dissidents are cordoned off from the President during pub-
lic appearances. While these zones originated in the 1980s, the 
use of them has grown considerably in the past few years. Critics 
argue that moving protesters to a remote location during Presi-
dential events gives the impression that there is no dissent. This 
paper explores the constitutionality of free speech zones, ulti-
mately demonstrating the shortcomings of the true threats doc-
trine, a legal framework for analysis in cases dealing with speech 
that may be threatening. This article suggests an alternative 
framework for analysis that would 1) better balance national 
security interests with speech protection for political dissidents 
and 2) clear up some of the doctrinal confusion in the application 
of the true threats doctrine in general. 
 
F irst Amendment scholars have shown us that historically anti-government political speech comes under attack by government officials more during wartime than peacetime.1 In the current U.S. climate created by the so-called “war on terror,” coupled with the physical war in Iraq, the political 
dissident again has become subject to speech restrictions. These infringements are 
far ranging – from issues of academic freedom to restriction of once public infor-
mation to invasions of privacy. The need to find a balance between protecting na-
tional security and protecting freedom of speech in this new climate requires that 
one think more complexly. One cannot underestimate the real threat of terrorist 
attacks. As legal scholar Frederick Schauer noted recently: 
Even the briefest look at the Internet will confirm that exhortations to violence 
and instructions for terrorism are all around us, and it would be hard to label all of 
them – or, certainly, their cumulative effect – as inconsequential or exaggerated. In 
light of this, it would be hard to maintain that everyone who worries abut the fact 
that virtually anyone can learn how to make a bomb on the Internet is a paranoid 
hysterical zealot.2 However, while not everyone is a “paranoid hysterical zealot,” 
that does not mean that we should allow our First Amendment rights to disintegrate 
under the pressure of fear. 
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For the purposes of this article, I focus on the creation of “free speech zones” at 
presidential appearances to illustrate one area in which fear of terrorism is leading 
to the censoring of what in the past had been considered protected political speech. 
Ultimately, I demonstrate the shortcomings of true threats doctrine, the legal frame-
work for analysis in cases dealing with possibly threatening speech, and offer an 
alternative framework for case analysis that may create a better balance between 
acknowledging the very real threats of terrorism with the right (and the absolute 
need in a democracy) for protection of the views of the political dissident. 
In this article, I first lay out contemporary issues concerning dissident political 
speech and then review the history of the suppression of political speech in the 
United States. The history will illustrate that this is not the first time that political 
speech has come under attack from the government. It also will help to distinguish 
those past moments from contemporary issues. I then specifically outline the ruling 
in Watts v. United States, the key Supreme Court cases dealing with true threats 
doctrine, following with a discussion of current court rulings concerning free 
speech zones. In the process of analyzing the free speech zone cases, I elaborate on 
the problematic nature of current legal interpretations of true threats doctrine. Fi-
nally, I address those same cases using an alternative framework for case analysis 
that will add context to those tests, thus allowing for a more nuanced way to con-
sider the difference between the true threat of terrorist speech and the protected 
right of dissident speech. 
 
 
The Post-9/11 Culture 
 
The most recent governmental assault on free speech rights began almost immedi-
ately following the 9/11 attacks. On the morning of September 12, 2001, President 
Bush set the tone for what would and would not be acceptable behavior for Ameri-
cans: “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against 
our country were more than acts of terror, they were acts of war. This will require 
our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve.”3 In that statement, 
President Bush implied a need for complete agreement on response to the attacks. 
What Bush implied, Attorney General John Ashcroft made clear in December of 
2001: “To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my 
message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity 
and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America’s enemies.”4 
Government leaders did more than just talk; they took action. Five days after 
the attack, the U.S. Patriot Act was proposed.5 President Bush signed the Act into 
law on October 26 after only six weeks of congressional deliberation.6 On Septem-
ber 21, 2001, only ten days following the attack, Chief U.S. Immigration Judge 
Michael J. Creppy issued a memorandum ordering the blanket closure of all depor-
tation hearings for “special interest” cases.7 
In 2002 in a statement before Congress, ACLU President Nadine Strossen 
urged, “We cannot allow the government to silence the voice of one dissenter with-
out weakening the core of our democracy.”8 According to studies conducted by the 
ACLU and the Freedom Forum’s First Amendment Center, Strossen had reason to 
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be concerned.9 For example, the ACLU produced a report titled “Under Fire: Dis-
sent in Post-9/11 America,” which outlined attacks of free speech across the coun-
try by federal, state and local government members, as well as by non-state ac-
tors.10 Occurrences reported in that document and other reports outlined a broad 
array of instances in which a range of different types of political speech were re-
stricted. For example, in Denver the ACLU found that the Denver Police Depart-
ment was monitoring the peaceful protests of activists belonging to the Noble Peace 
prize-winning organization American Friends Service Committee.11 In St. Louis 
and Baltimore police did more than monitor protests; they interfered with them.12 
Silent, individual protests were also grounds for government intervention. On 
college campuses, students have been reprimanded by police for hanging a U.S. 
flag upside down13 and have been visited by the FBI for displaying anti-war post-
ers.14 In high schools, officials suspended two teachers and guidance counselor for 
displaying posters with anti-American sentiments15 and in another incident a stu-
dent was suspended for wearing a t-shirt critical of President Bush.16 
 
 
A History of Suppression 
 
The Alien and Sedition Acts were established by the Federalists at time when war 
with France seemed imminent.17 Thomas Jefferson, a Republican, pardoned all of 
those convicted when he took office.18 During the Civil War period, the government 
again attempted to curtail speech rights. This assault on speech, however, was not 
an open one. Instead, the Lincoln administration found other ways to suppress 
speech, primarily through suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.19 In his recent 
book Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the 
War on Terrorism, Geoffrey Stone reported more than 13,000 people were detained 
without being charged.20 In addition to these federal laws, states used criminal anar-
chy and criminal syndicalism laws to restrict speech at the state level. 
The next round of Federal speech regulation would come about in the midst of 
World War I with the passage of The Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1918.21 These 
acts would lead to a trilogy of Supreme Court cases in 1919 and the birth of the 
clear and present danger doctrine. Justice Holmes wrote the opinion for a unani-
mous Court in the first of these cases, Schenk v. United States.22 This case looked at 
the conviction of Charles Schenk, general secretary of the Socialist party. Schenk 
had been convicted in trial court of violating the 1917 Espionage Act by circulating 
an antidraft leaflet. Both the Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
his conviction. Justice Holmes noted that while the leaflets likely would be pro-
tected speech in certain time periods “the character of every act depends upon the 
circumstances in which it is done.”23 Words that created a “clear and present dan-
ger” could be constitutionally proscribed. 
One week later, the Court would hear the next two Espionage cases. First, the 
Court heard the case of Frohwerk v. United States.24 Jacob Frohwerk had been 
charged and found guilty for publishing a newspaper critical of the U.S. govern-
ment’s involvement in the war. The Supreme Court penned a unanimous decision 
upholding the conviction. On the same day, the Court ruled on Debs v. United 
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States.25 Again the U.S. Supreme held that Socialist Party leader Eugene Debs had 
violated the Alien and Sedition Acts, this time by delivering an anti-war speech. 
Eight months later, Justices Holmes and Brandeis took their clear and present 
doctrine to fruition, writing dissenting opinions in Abrams v. United States.26 In this 
case, the Court in a 7-2 decision affirmed the conviction of Russian immigrants 
who circulated leaflets critical of the U.S. government’s intervention in the Russian 
Revolution. While the conviction was upheld, what are most significant about this 
case are the dissents. Justice Holmes argued in Abrams, and repeated several more 
times in dissenting opinions throughout the decade that followed, that in most cir-
cumstances the answer to threatening speech is more speech, not restriction.27 How-
ever, he found that some speech “so imminently threatens immediate interference 
with lawful and pressing purposes of the law” that it does not qualify for First 
Amendment protection. Key to Holmes’ conception of the clear and present danger 
doctrine was this notion of imminence. Holmes and Brandeis would repeat this idea 
in minority opinions several more times in cases throughout the next decade; how-
ever, it would be 1969 before it would become part of the central argument in a 
majority opinion.28 
The next sedition law would come in response to fears of the impending World 
War II. Congress approved the Smith Act more than one year before the war actu-
ally started.29 Not one case based on the Smith Act reached the U.S. Supreme Court 
during the war, but with the Cold War looming, the Act would become significant 
in the following decade. Almost immediately following the war, a series of events 
fell into place that would lead ultimately to a Communist witch hunt.  The Soviet 
Union, a former ally in the fight against Nazi Germany, exerted its authority over 
the nations of Eastern Europe. By 1949, despite financial efforts by the United 
States, China fell under Communist rule.30 That same year, the USSR exploded its 
first nuclear bomb. It was in this environment that Eugene Dennis and ten other 
members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party were indicted in New 
York under the Smith Act.31 
Dennis v. United States is of particular significance given the similarities be-
tween the climate of that period and today’s climate. Just like today, the focus of 
the U.S. was on fighting an ideology more than a war. In Dennis, the Supreme 
Court in a 6-2 decision found the conviction under the Smith Act to be constitu-
tional. Chief Justice Vinson wrote the plurality opinion in which he distinguished 
the act of studying ideas about advocacy from the actual advocacy itself. Pointing 
to the language in the act itself, Vinson deduced: “Congress did not intend to eradi-
cate the free discussion of political theories, to destroy the traditional rights of 
Americans to discuss and evaluate ideas without fear of government sanction.”32 
However, Vinson did not add any further context to where to draw the line between 
studying about advocacy and pure advocacy except to state that any member of the 
Communist party is advocating violent overthrow based strictly on their member-
ship. The Court found that Dennis and his associates crossed the line into advocat-
ing the overthrow of the U.S. government simply because the very purpose of the 
Communist Party is the overthrow of non-Communist governments.33 
In the 1957 decision in Yates v. United States, however, the Court applied a 
more detailed definition of the difference between advocating ideas and advocating 
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illegal action.34 Justice Harlan, in comparing Dennis to Yates, wrote: “In failing to 
distinguish between advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract doctrine and 
advocacy of action to that end, the District Court appears to have been led astray by 
the holding in Dennis that advocacy of violent action to be taken at some future 
time was enough.”35 With that ruling, the Court began to move away from the fear-
induced rulings concerning advocacy of Communism toward a more defined doc-
trine of determining the line between ideas and action.36 Also with the Yates ruling, 
the period of the U.S. Supreme Court allowing the restriction of pro-Communist 
speech ended. As noted previously, however, anti-government speech has again 
come under attack post-9/11. None of these attempts to restrict speech have made 
their way to the Supreme Court yet. When they do, some of those incidents that fall 
under the auspice of threats (to political leaders or to national security) will be held 
to the “true threats” definition established in Watts v. United States. 
 
 
Watts v. United States 
 
During an anti-war demonstration in the late 1960s, an 18-year-old made the fol-
lowing statement: 
 
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have 
already received my draft classification as I-A and I have got to 
report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If 
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get into my 
sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black 
brothers.37 This statement would lead to the case, Watts v. United 
States, the case that added the true threats doctrine to the pre-
existing clear and present danger test. 
 
Robert Watts was arrested and subsequently convicted of violating a 1917 statute 
that prohibits any person from “knowingly and willfully…[making] any threat to 
take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States…”38 
The per curium opinion stated that the statute is constitutional on its face but “must 
be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind.”39 The 
Court’s opinion focused on the “willfulness” requirement in the statute.40 It con-
cluded “whatever the ‘willfulness’ requirement implies, the statute initially requires 
the Government to prove a true ‘threat.’”41 
In order to determine whether or not the comments made at the rally constituted 
a true threat, the Court struck a balance between the language in the statute and “the 
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on pub-
lic issues should be uninhabited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well in-
clude vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on the govern-
ment and public officials.”42 The Court concluded that Watt’s comments did not 
constitute a true threat, that they were in fact merely a “very crude offensive 
method of stating a political opposition to the President.”43 
While the significance of Watts in relationship to protection of political speech 
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should not be underestimated, how much strength does it carry in today’s world 
where fears of terrorist attack are very intense and very real?44 The combination of 
a long history of governmental attempts to suppress oppositional political speech, 
combined with the vagueness of the Watts ruling, places government officials and 
the lower courts in the position to determine who gets to speak their political views 
and who doesn’t. For example, while the Court did distinguish political hyperbole 
from an actual true threat, it did not offer a concrete definition of what types of 
speech might constitute true threats.45 As one legal scholar noted recently: “Despite 
Watt’s speech-protective language, the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a clear 
standard in that case or subsequent cases for what constitutes a true threat has con-
tributed to the doctrinal confusion that has persisted for more than thirty years.”46 
Lower courts have applied the standard inconsistently.47 This lack of clarity could 
lead to the prosecution of political speech that under normal circumstances would-
n’t occur. As legal scholar Linda Gilbert noted, “In light of current doctrinal confu-
sion in this area, and without a strong reaffirmance from the Supreme Court, the 




Free Speech Zones 
 
Free speech zones are areas set aside in public places, primarily during political 
events, in which protestors are removed to a secured, cordoned off space. These 
zones are supposedly designed to allow protestors a place to express their views 
free of interference from law enforcement officials. While free speech zones at po-
litical events have a history starting in the late 1980s, use of the zones has grown 
considerably following the September 11 attacks.49 Specifically, the United States 
Secret Service now routinely forces protestors who are critical of President Bush 
into free speech zones during presidential appearances. According to critics of these 
zones, protestors are removed to remote locations where those opposed to the Presi-
dent are quarantined away from both the view of the President and of the media.50 
Political activists and groups supporting the President are permitted to remain 
closer to the event and thus to media coverage. Secret Service members and local 
law enforcement officials have arrested protestors refusing to adhere to the free 
speech zone restrictions. 
Three of those arrests have resulted in court rulings in the past three years. In 
the first instance, 65-year-old retired steel worker Bill Neel was arrested at a presi-
dential appearance during a 2002 Labor Day picnic in Pittsburgh.51 Supporters of 
Bush were permitted to stay along the route of the motorcade, while protestors were 
removed to a free speech zone 500 feet away from the site of the President’s 
speech. Neel, one of the protestors, refused to go to the free speech zone and in-
stead stood with the Bush supporters. Neel held a sign that read: “The Bush Family 
Must Surely Love the Poor, They Made so Many of Us.” Neel was charged with 
disorderly conduct for refusing to move to the free speech zone. 
At Neel’s trial in 2002, a Pittsburgh detective testified that local police were 
directed by the Secret Service to confine people “that were making a statement 
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pretty much against the President and his views.” District Court Justice Shirley 
Trkula threw out the charges against Neel, stating: “I believe this is America. 
Whatever happened to ‘I do not agree with you, but I’ll defend to the death your 
right to say it.’” 
Two later cases did not end as favorably for free speech rights. On July 24, 
2003, President Bush appeared in front of the Treasury Financial Facility in Phila-
delphia.52 ACORN, The Association of Community Organizations for Reform 
Now, attended the event to picket the President’s visit in an attempt to draw atten-
tion to what they felt were discriminatory tax benefit laws. When they arrived, they 
were informed by Secret Service members that “no one except police personnel 
would be allowed directly in front of the [Treasury Financial Facility].” ACORN 
agreed to move their protest across the street; however, they soon discovered that 
citizens supporting the President were permitted to remain directly in front of the 
building. ACORN’s legal council on site complained to the Secret Service, and 
according to some reports, were retaliated against further by having “several large 
police vans directly in front of [the protestors],” in effect blocking them from the 
President’s (and the media’s) view. 
The ACLU filed suit, claiming that ACORN’s First Amendment rights had been 
violated. In addition, the ACLU sought a permanent injunction against the Secret 
Service to enjoin them from ever establishing free speech zones at presidential ap-
pearances. The ACLU raised three issues in its lawsuit: 1) that free speech zones 
prohibit protestors from gathering in places where other members of the public are 
permitted to gather; 2) that free speech zones keep the President from viewing or 
listening to protestors; and 3) that, as result of the first two issues, free speech 
zones give the impression that there is less political dissent than is actually true. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania re-
jected the ACLU’s claims, stating that they were “too amorphous to be justicable at 
[that] point in time.” The court did add, however, that “the defendants may indeed 
have violated [the] plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.” Thus, the court simply de-
nied to rule on the overall constitutionality of free speech zones. 
The third court case grew out of a presidential appearance at an airport in Co-
lumbia, South Carolina, on October 4, 2002.53 On the day of the rally, law enforce-
ment officers were assigned to patrol the perimeter of an unmarked restricted 
area.54 Vehicles and people were allowed to travel through the restricted area until 
shortly before the President arrived. The only pedestrians allowed to stay in the 
area were those waiting in line with tickets to enter the hangar for the rally. Brett 
Bursey, the director for the Progressive Network, went to the rally with the intent of 
protesting the Bush administrations call for war against Iraq. Bursey proceeded to 
go into the restricted area with signs and a megaphone. Law enforcement offices 
requested Bursey leave the restricted area. He did move his location, but stayed 
inside of the area. After a 25-minute confrontation between Bursey and the officers, 
he was arrested for trespassing, a charge that was later dropped.55 
More than four months following his initial arrest, Bursey was charged by the 
United States Attorney with violating Title 18, Section 1752 (a)(1)(ii).56 Following 
a two-day bench trial in November of 2003, Bursey was convicted and sentenced to 
a $500 fine and a $10 special assessment. Bursey appealed but his sentence was 
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subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Bursey argued 
in court that he was not aware that he was in a federally cordoned off area. He 
stated that the law enforcement officers never told him such and that the free 
speech zone was not clearly demarcated. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that 
“Bursey thus took a calculated risk when he defied the orders of the officers to 
leave the restricted area, thereby intending to act unlawfully.”57 Bursey appealed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court but on January 17, 2006, the Justices declined to hear the 





While none of the above free speech zone cases directly called into question the 
true threats doctrine, the reasoning employed by the Secret Service and other police 
officials relies on the belief that these zones are needed to protect the President. 
Considering the severity of the speech restriction, one would think that a more rig-
orous proof of threat would need to occur before placing a prior restraint on par-
ticular political views. If the Supreme Court ever were to rule on the constitutional-
ity of free speech zones, the government would have a high burden to bear. And, 
given that testimony from law enforcement officials speaks to concerns of violence 
against the President, then true threats would be the obvious legal argument. 
How would the lower court free speech zone cases look through the lens of the 
true threats doctrine? Would the government be forced to stop removing political 
dissidents from the center stage? Would the Watts case, which itself dealt with 
statements critical of the President, lead to a decision that the free speech zones as 
they are currently enforced are a viewpoint-based form of discrimination not per-
mitted under the First Amendment? Because the courts have yet to deal with the 
constitutionality issue, these questions remain speculative, but it is based on this 
speculation that I will address the possibility of the true threats application to free 
speech zone cases. 
The Watts’ true threat standard raises problems because of its lack of clarity. As 
previously mentioned, the Watts case itself only made it clear that political hyper-
bole could not be considered a true threat. In 2003, the Court in Virginia v. Black 
added to the definition of true threats.58 Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, 
said that true threats “encompass those statements where the speaker means to com-
municate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to 
a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend 
to carry out the threat.”59 Despite this additional language in Black, the true threats 
doctrine still does not offer sufficient guidance. The lower courts have added to the 
lack of clarity, producing contradictory rulings in some cases.60 Two recent Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals illustrate the magnitude of the confusion. 
In 2002 in Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. American Coali-
tion of Life Activists the Ninth Circuit ruled that anti-abortion websites featuring 
abortion doctors’ faces in wanted-poster style format constituted a true threat pro-
scribable under the First Amendment.61 Three years later in United States v. Cassel, 
the court upheld the constitutionality of a federal law that prohibited “intimidation 
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to hinder, prevent, or attempt to hinder people from buying or attempting to buy 
federal land.”62 What is most problematic about the rulings in these cases is that the 
court applied different standards in each case. In Planned Parenthood, the court 
applied an objective standard for intent under the true threats test. Specifically, the 
court defined a true threat as a statement made when a "reasonable person would 
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker com-
municates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm.”63 In other words, 
true threats are defined by whether or not a reasonable person would find them 
threatening. Jennifer Elrod explains: 
As proscribable acts, true threats have a number of detrimental impacts on soci-
ety in general and on targeted individuals in particular. Chief among these are the 
fear and apprehension that threats engender, the disruption prompted by such fear, 
and the cost of protecting against, reducing, preventing, or eliminating the threat-
ened violence.64 
True threats as defined through the application of the objective standard is about 
whether or not the words could be construed as threatening, not whether or not the 
speaker intended to carry out the threat. In Cassel, the Ninth Circuit applied a sub-
jective standard. The appeals court determined that “speech may be deemed unpro-
tected by the First Amendment as a ‘true threat’ only upon proof that the speaker 
subjectively intended the speech as a threat.”65 In other words, the subjective test 
relies on attempting to determine the speaker’s motive. Does he intend to or can he 
reasonably carry out the threat? Whether or not a reasonable person would find the 
words threatening is not significant. 
Planned Parenthood and Cassel exemplify the confusion that lower courts 
across the country have been experiencing. Both the subjective and objective ap-
proaches as currently conceived are problematic. The subjective standard com-
pletely ignores the issue that speech can be threatening to the target even if the 
speaker did not actually intend physical harm. This criterion seems counter to the 
language in Black that  “the speaker need not actually intend to carry out the 
threat.” It also can be considered problematic if one agrees with Elrod that the rea-
son for proscribing threats is largely because of “the fear and apprehension that 
threats engender,” a position that seems reasonable in light of the ruling in Black. 
The objective standard offers significantly more context to the true threats doctrine. 
For example, in Watts the Court considered questions of both content and context. 
The Court took into account how the audience reacted to Watts’ statements, the 
location he was in, and who was in the audience he was speaking to. In Black, the 
Court made this distinction even more pointedly, assessing that cross burnings 
could be used either to intimidate or as a form of ideological solidarity. As a result, 
the Court had to consider the location of the speaker and the make up of the audi-
ence. However, due to the fact that the Ninth Circuit ruled on Cassel after the Black 
decision, the true threats doctrine, even with the added discussion in Black, still 
lacks the clarity needed to distinguish critical political discourse from true threats. 
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An Alternative Approach 
 
One way to clear up the confusion in the lower courts would be for the U.S. Su-
preme Court to make explicit some of the criteria that was applied implicitly in 
Black, specifically its reliance on history as a determining factor and its acknowl-
edgement that the same speech in different circumstances can have very different 
meaning. Adding those extra criteria would create a three-prong test that would 
consider: (1) the character, nature, and scope of the speech restriction; (2) the his-
torical context of the cultural groups involved in the speech at issue; and (3) the 
individual power relations occurring in the particular speech moment.66 
The first prong of the framework requires a consideration of the character, na-
ture and scope of the speech. This prong takes into account the significance of con-
sidering content as a major factor in determining the First Amendment validity of 
speech restrictions. However, it explores more than just the basic question of 
whether a restriction is content-based or viewpoint-based (the nature of the restric-
tion). It adds to that criterion two others – the character of the speech (political 
speech or commercial speech, for example) and the scope of the restriction (a total 
ban or partial ban, for example). This more contextual, complex analysis of content
-based restrictions comes from Justice John Paul Stevens’ concurrence in R.A.V. v. 
St. Paul.67 He explained that by considering the multiple elements previously listed, 
the Court could apply “a more subtle and complex analysis” that would allow for 
the possibility of both content- and viewpoint-based restrictions being acceptable so 
long as they met strict scrutiny standards.68 By reviewing the restriction in terms of 
the character of speech, the nature of the restriction, and the scope of the restriction, 
the Court can offer a more encompassing consideration of the government’s rea-
sons for censoring or restricting speech. 
The second prong of the test to be considered is historical context. Specifically, 
the Court would consider the historic context based on culturally constructed group 
identity when reviewing whether to restrict speech. Various empirical, psychologi-
cal and historical data could be used to determine the status of a group’s historical 
disempowerment. Legal scholars have suggested ways in which psychological and 
social scientific studies could be used in this fashion.69 Others, most notably Alex-
ander Tsesis, have outlined ways in which historical data could be used to deter-
mine the level of disempowerment individuals may feel based on their group iden-
tity.70 Most recently, in the cross burning case Virginia v. Black, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor writing for the majority discussed at length the history of cross burning 
in the United States and concluded that “to this day, regardless of whether the mes-
sage is a political one or whether the message is also meant to intimidate, the burn-
ing of a cross is a ‘symbol of hate.’”71 In the Virginia ruling, the historic message of 
cross burning was a determining factor. 
If speech has the power both to oppress and to resist oppression, then, depend-
ing on the history of a person’s group identity, the speaker will feel more or less 
social power and so will feel more or less entitlement to speak. Unless the First 
Amendment is applied in accordance with the way this power operates, free speech 
laws will continue to work as part of the hegemonic process, allowing only brief 
moments of temporary change that ultimately will be rearticulated in terms of the 
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dominant group. Groups that currently are privileged by dominant power structures 
will continue to have more cultural and political rights than those who have been 
and continue to be disempowered. 
The final prong of the framework is the relational nature of the power between 
speakers. By focusing on this relational power, this framework requires a consid-
eration of the power dynamic of the specific speech situation. For example, does 
the speech take place on public property or private? Are the speakers alone or sur-
rounded by others? The Court in Virginia v. Black took into consideration to some 
degree this particular element when they considered the intimidation factor. In that 
case, the Court made a distinction between a cross burning on private property at a 
Ku Klux Klan rally and a cross burning in someone’s yard as a form of intimida-
tion. In the case of the rally, the speech should be protected, but in the private prop-
erty situation, the speech crosses the line into intimidation and so is not protected 
under the First Amendment. According to the majority, “[T]he act of burning a 
cross may mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimida-




Applying the Framework 
 
The true threats test on its face takes the character, nature and scope of the speech 
into consideration. However, reviewing the details behind the ultimate arrests of 
Neel and Bursey, the application of true threats is not always content, nor view-
point, neutral. In both of those cases, as well as the ACORN example, only protes-
tors of the President were restricted to the free speech zones. Supporters were wel-
come to appear closer to the President and to the media. Equally problematic in the 
free speech zone cases is the nature of the speech being restricted. True threats doc-
trine applies specifically to low value speech. However, the free speech zones spe-
cifically target political speech, the most valued speech under First Amendment 
protection. Given the climate of the post-9/11 U.S., fear of attack against the Presi-
dent is certainly valid. Those people expressing disagreement with the President 
may well intend to carry out a true threat. However, without more context in the 
application of true threats doctrine, the ease of abuse toward those who merely are 
vocalizing their disagreement with governmental policy can, and in the cases men-
tioned above have, led to prosecution of people based solely on their criticism, not 
on any actual proof of intent to threaten the President. This problem could be reme-
died in one of two ways. Either all attendees at presidential debates, no matter their 
political position, could be cordoned off into free speech zones. Or, the two addi-
tional elements concerning history and the individual speech moment could be 
brought into consideration, thus allowing for the citizenry to continue participating 
at the level prior to 9/11. 
The majority opinion in Virginia v. Black focuses at great length on the history 
of cross burning in the U.S. It is in the context of this history that Justice O’Connor 
draws a distinction between cross burning used to intimidate and those used to rein-
force ideological solidarity. The former constitutes an unprotected threat and the 
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latter a protected form of political speech. Applying this in regard to political pro-
testors at presidential appearances would force the courts, and in turn law enforce-
ment agencies, to take into account the nature of the political protest in question. 
The history of the political dissident in U.S. culture is extensive. Protestors rou-
tinely show up at political events, particularly those where the President is on hand. 
This tradition goes to the root of the town hall meeting concept in our representa-
tive government in which the people have a right to redress and hold accountable 
elected government officials. Given this history, the arrests of Bursey and Neel 
would have to be considered unconstitutional forms of prior restraint. In both of 
those cases, the protestors were silenced before their messages could be heard. 
Conversely, history could be used as a way to determine that some speakers pose a 
significantly higher threat than others. If, for example, protesters uttering or dis-
playing threatening messages had a record of committing violent acts, their history 
of violence could be used as a factor in limiting their access to the President. 
Application of the third prong of the framework – consideration of the relational 
nature of the power between speakers – not only adds context to the true threats 
doctrine but also offers a balance between the current conflicting objective and sub-
jective standards. This prong analyzes the power dynamic occurring between the 
speaker and spoken to, not the objective interpretation of the reasonable person, 
nor, conversely, the subjective determination of the speaker’s intent. Again, the 
Court in Black considers this relationship, albeit not directly. In Black, the majority 
drew a distinction between the speech moment occurring when a cross is burned in 
the yard of an African American and when a cross is burned at a KKK rally in a 
discreet location. The physical act of burning the cross is the same but the location 
and audience are the defining factors. 
In regard to protestors at presidential appearances, the act of political dissent is 
the same. The individual ways in which that dissent is manifested and its location 
and audience makeup change. For example, one person carrying a sign at a presi-
dential appearance saying “Overthrow the Government,” might be a significantly 
different moment that 200 people carrying those signs. In addition, a sign that reads 
“The Bush Family Must Surely Love the Poor, They Made so Many of Us” is a 
different speech moment than a one that reads “Overthrow the Government, Now.” 
Given the multitude of permeations that could occur, free speech zones need to be 
structured either more concretely or more loosely. In other words, free speech 
zones could avoid the current viewpoint censorship by restricting all attendees into 
such zones. Or, the free speech zones could be applied much in the same way that 
the Court in Black applied the Virginia statute. This reading would provide for a 
case-by-case determination based on individual speech moments and not simply on 





By focusing on the issue of free speech zones at presidential appearances, this arti-
cle highlights just one area where speech is being restricted in the name of national 
security. The free speech zone restrictions in and of themselves are problematic. 
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When political dissidents are cordoned off away from the President, the public and 
the press, it creates the illusion that there is no dissent, silencing the dissenters and 
leaving the general public ignorant of alternative political opinions. This restriction, 
particularly if reified through a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, can have long-term 
ramifications. As illustrated in this article, historically when First Amendment 
rights have come up against concerns about national security during times of crisis, 
free speech has lost out. For example, the clear and present danger standard devel-
oped in the trilogy of Supreme Court cases in 1919 allowed for continued suppres-
sion of dissident political speech until the Yates ruling in 1957. For almost 40 years, 
the U.S. government passed legislation restricting the expression of certain anti-
government ideology, and the U.S. Supreme Court continued to uphold these re-
strictions through a series of rulings. What this history demonstrates is that regula-
tions established during times of national crisis can have an impact long after the 
immediate crisis has passed. 
Focusing on the free speech zone issue also helps to bring to light the inconsis-
tencies in the application of the true threats doctrine. While Black appeared to fur-
ther define the scope of the true threats doctrine, subsequent conflicting Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals rulings show that this is not the case. Gilbert’s concern that 
the standard developed in Watts contributed to thirty years of doctrinal confusion 
remains valid today despite the additional language in Black intended to clarify the 
parameters of the standard. The implications of this confusion extend far beyond 
the issue of free speech zones. Until the Court develops a test that can be applied 
more consistently, dissident political and social discourse will remain vulnerable to 
the temperament of the particular court applying the true threats standard. 
This article has offered a constitutionally sound solution that would add depth 
to the true threats standard.  Application of this three-prong analysis to free speech 
zone shows them to be a form of viewpoint-based prior restraint. By law enforce-
ments’ own testimony, only those who disagree with the President are removed 
from the location of his appearance, leaving only one side of the political spectrum 
allowed to participate and be visible. However, by adding the elements of history 
and the relational power between speakers, free speech zones could be constructed 
and applied in a more neutral fashion that promotes political participation while 
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